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I This paper reports a study of three training programs: for tool and die
makers, for offset printers, and for restaurant cooks and chefs. Each of the
I
three programs was financed by the federal government under the Manpower Devel-
opment and Training Act of 1962. All of the programs provided training for
labor shortage occupations. All were, in addition, sponsored by multiestab-
lishment organizations; employer associations in the case of the tool and die
and the cooks -chefs programs, an employer association in conjunction with a
trade union local in the case of the offset printers program. The multiestab-
I
lishment sponsorship was derivative of another shared characteristic of the
programs: employment in the crafts for which they trained is dispersed over
a large number of establishments each of which is small in relation to the total
market. This last characteristic was the basis upon which the programs were
selected for study.
I
A considerable portion of occupational training in the United States is
known to occur on the job under employer sponsorship and supervision. This
is true generally; it is particularly important in blue-collar occupations.
Federal manpower programs, reflecting the increasing awareness of this fact by
policy makers, have moved toward greater emphasis upon subsidies to employers
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to provide training in their own establishments. Since employers are already
providing a good deal of such training on their own, federal programs of this type
are beset by the danger^ that the government will simply absorb the cost of
existing training efforts: the programs will then make no net contributions to
3the pool of trained manpower.
This danger appeared least acute in the case of occupations with dispersed
employment. Because each employer is small in relationship to the market, he
could expect to meet his labor needs by pirating from competitors and would
therefore lack an incentive to train his own workers. Correspondingly, the
difficulty of preventing his competitors from pirating workers which he did train
should deter reliance upon training as a means of adjustment to labor shortage.
These considerations lead one to expect an underinvestment in human capital in
dispersed employment occupations relative to occupations where employment is
concentrated in one or a few establishments and a high potential payoff to
federal training efforts in the former category. It was initially thought,
therefore, that a study of the returns of such a program would provide a bench-
mark against which to compare the returns in other programs where the problems
of assessing the program's net contributions were more difficult.
It became apparent, however, that despite the dispersion of employment in
the occupations studied, there were strong endogeneous patterns of manpower
training and utilization. The existence of these patterns made it impossible to
assume that the training offered by the federal programs was net; it raised again
the question of whether federal financing substituted for private efforts which
would have occurred in its absence or, more generally, how in fact such substitu-
tion is to be avoided in the design and administration of the programs. These
questions became the central focus of the study and the body of this paper is
directed at answers to them. The paper is divided into two sections. The first
section describes and attempts to explain the endogenous training patterns in
the occupations studied and the problems which these patterns pose for evaluation.
The second section details the forces which led to the financing of the particu-
lar programs under study, and discussed, in the light of these forces and of the
endogenous training patterns, the problem of insuring that the funds make a net
training contribution.
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I. Endogenous Training Patterns in Dispersed Employment Occupations
Two endogenous patterns of training emerged in the dispersed occupations
under study. First, as in occupations with concentrated employment, a number of
individual employers organized training programs of their own. The second pattern,
not noticeable in industries with concentrated employment, was one in which the
worker took the initiative, programming his own training by movement from job to
job in search of new experience. Because of its novelty, this second pattern
receives disproportionate attention in what follows. It predominated in the
cook-chef training: there were virtually no employer-organized training programs
in the restaurant industry. In the industries which employ tool and die makers,
the trainee-programmed pattern coexisted with employer-organized training. The
latter pattern predominated in printing.
Employer-Organized Training
The employer-organized training for printers and for tool and die makers
did not differ in essentials from training patterns, which other studies have
4documented, in large enterprises with extensive internal labor markets. The
I
training takes place largely on the job in the process of production. Experi-
enced craftsmen or line supervisors serve as instructors communicating the required
skills orally and by demonstration to the trainee who then perfects them through
repetition in the performance of his productive responsibilities. The learning
process is often programmed automatically by a line of progression, the employee
moving by promotion through a sequence of jobs which build an increasingly complex
and diversified set of skills. Alternatively, the supervisor programs the
learning process by assigning the trainee a progression of tasks which build
his skills in a manner analagous to job progression. Training in the process
of production is sometimes preceded by what is called vestibule training. The
I
essential difference between this and other on the job training is that the
demonstration and practice occur in a formal setting established specifically
for training purposes.
Both the printing and the tool and die programs closely followed the
standard on the job training patterns. The offset printing training was basic-
ally a vestibule program. The tool and die program combined an initial ten
week vestibule program with a second phase of training in the process of production.
In this second phase, the trainee was hired by employers who agreed in advance
to make special training efforts. For this, they received a small subsidy. The
employer efforts were overseen by a trainer-coach under a system similar to
that employed in the restaurant program and described in detail below. The tool
and die program also provided, during the ten week vestibule stage, some formal
classroom instruction in math, physics and tool management. Under normal circum-
stances, tool and die makers acquire their math and physics in trade school or
through correspondence courses; upon rare occasions, it is offered in employer
sponsored classes.
Because the endogenous training patterns so closely resembles the patterns
in occupations with concentrated employment, the programs in printing and tool
and die faced the double dilemma of federal programs in concentrated occupations.
If the programs operate independently of employers, who control the allocation of
labor in the industry, they may end by providing training which the worker is
barred from utilizing. If the programs are too closely intergrated with existing
systems of training and allocation, however, they may end by financing training
which the employer would otherwise have paid for himself.
The offset printing program managed to get caught on both of the horns of
this dilemma. The program was designed to train journeymen letterpress operators
for offset work. With one exception, it was conducted independently of employers.
Most trainees were recruited directly by the unions. They attended on their
own, in many cases without their employers' knowledge, and as a result, no use
was made of the training once it was completed. Only 10 of 29 respondents in a
survey of three classes of the program, were utilizing the training with any
degree of regularity. Of these 10, moreover, two had been offset pressmen
before entering the course, two became vocational high school teachers, and one
had been able to utilize the training only after opening his own shop.
The one close employer link was with the company whose facilities were
leased for the program and whose supervisors were hired to conduct it. Eight
of the employees of this company were among the program trainees, and the company
president admitted that in the absence of federal financing, it would most
likely have provided the training on its own.
Since a portion of the tool and die industry is characterized by high turn-
over and worker-controlled labor allocation, the program in that industry managed
to avoid the problems generated by independence from employers. It did not,
however, totally avoid the second problem. At least two of the large companies
hiring program participants sent their own employees into the program and, hence,
appeared to be utilizing it to obtain training which they would otherwise have
provided in-house. Unfortunately, the response to the mail questionnaire for
this program was poor, and it was impossible to determine the full extent to which
federal financing was substituting for private funds.
Given the essential similarity between training in these occupations and
training in occupations with concentrated employment, such failings are not
surprising. The more interesting analytical problem is the existence of the
similarity in the first place. Its existence implies that our initial presump-
tion that the concentration of employment was the prime determinant of employer
sponsorship was naive. A contrast of the printing industry with the restaurant
industry in which employers did not sponsor training suggests two additional
factors. The most important of these appears to be specialization of equip-
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ment. In the printing industry, where employers sponsorship predominated, shop
equipment tends to have peculiarities which render efficient operation a relatively
specialized skill. As a result, most workers can not move easily from shop to
shop; turnover is low; and employers can generally expect a return to investment
in training. In contrast, the restaurant industry where employers typically
do not sponsor training, does not have specialized equipment; almost all kitchens
use roughly the same utensils and machinery; training is, therefore, general
and the employer attachment of the labor force is low.
A second factor of some importance in determining the pattern of training
is the degree to which internal lines of progression are feasible. Most printing
establishments are large enough to differentiate jobs in a way which enables
workers to learn parts of one job while performing a job below it in a line of
progression. The typical restaurant is too small to divide its work in this
way; there is not enough work at each skill level to keep a man busy full time.
The exceptions in printing appear to confirm this hypothesis. Unusually small
shops place a higher premium upon trade school graduation than their larger
competitors, apparently because the lower steps in the natural line of progression
are lacking. In the restaurant industry, the exceptions are not so easily recon-
ciled with the hypothesis. One restaurant in the study relied heavily upon
internal training and promotion from within. Its kitchen, while among the
larger of those studied, was considerably smaller t"han the kitchens of several
hotels which did not rely upon internal promotion. It appears, however, that
the discrepancy can be attributed to differences in turnover patterns. Hotel
turnover is raised by interior working conditions (irregular hours, notoriously
intense heat and production pressures) to levels which prohibit reliance upon
internal progression. Conversely, turnover in the restaurant relying upon inter-
nal progression was dampened by its reputation as the region's most fashionable
eating place.
Tool and die, because it exhibits both the restaurant and the printing
patterns, might have proved the most fruitful source of insights into the deter-
minants of training. Interpretation is complicated, however, by the fact that
establishments hiring tool and die trainees did not compose a single industry.
Nonetheless, for the establishments as a group, three factors appeared responsible
for employer sponsorship of training. All three were exhibited by establishments
which were absolutely large (75 or more employees) although arguably this was
coincidental. First, large units tend to provide the fringe benefits, seniority
rights, and prospect of employment stability which reduce turnover and, hence,
enable the employer to capture the returns to training which he provides. Second,
some large establishments, although they employed only a small number of tool and
die makers, had a very large number of machinists. This permitted the development
of a certain degree of progression leading into the tool room. Finally, there
was some indication that in establishments producing long runs of standard
products, the tool and die makers become narrowly trained. Their skills are
not, therefore, readily transferable. Turnover is thereby reduced, and the
employer sponsorship of training encouraged.
Worker-Programmed Training
The second training pattern which emerges in dispersed employment industries
is worker-programmed training
. This pattern is most readily described and
analyzed in terms of restaurant cooks. With certain exceptions noted below,
the training of tool and die makers, when it was not employer sponsored and
controlled, followed a similar pattern.
The first and most fundamental characteristic of cook training is that it
is worker programmed. The individual can program his own on-the-job training
through frequent job changes, remaiining in one establishment so long as he has
something to learn there, moving on when the job is no longer instructive. Some-
times the movement is vertical, involving heavier responsibility, more skill, or
better pay and/or working conditions. But lateral moves, motivated solely by
the exhaustion of learning opportunities or the search for higher quality instruc-
tion, are also frequent. These worker-initiated job changes generate the kind of
exposure to tasks and skills provided elsewhere by movement along an internal
line of progression or supervised rotation of work assignments. The training on
the job is supplemented by formal institutional instruction in the culinary arts
(e.g., baking, haute cuisine, meat cutting, tallow carving, and the like) obtained,
for the most part, from specialized proprietary schools. The courses are not
standard; the trainee must piece together his curriculum from a variety of differ-
ent schools. Some of the chefs interviewed for this study appeared to have attended
classes intermittently over ten or fifteen year periods. Again, the individual
seeks out and evaluates for himself formal educational opportunities which, in
concentrated occupations, are frequently provided by the employer and almost
always pre-screened by management and brought to the worker's attention by his
supervisor.
The shift in the locus of initiative and responsibility for training may
be viewed as an instance of a more general phenomenon: the degree of active
responsibility for the organization of the labor market and the deployment of
the work force assumed by institutions on the supply side of the market increases
as the employing institutions fragmentize. Thus, for example, trade unions in
large, oligopolistic enterprises tend to be essentially passive, operating to
restrain or compel managerial activity. Their role contrasts sharply with that
of unions in dispersed industries like garments or construction where the union
is an active agent engaging in such activities as the management of health and
pension funds, the operation of hiring halls, and the provision of consulting
services on subjects which elsewhere are closely guarded managerial perrogatives
.
The employer sponsorship of training in the garment industry -- or in printing
and parts of tool and die for that matter -- indicates that degree of fragmenta-
tion is not the only variable governing the distribution of market functions
between the institutions of demand and those of supply. The role of fragment-
ation is nonetheless instructive: it suggests that other institutions on the
supply side may be able to substitute for the worker, assuming the task of
programming training when employing institutions abrogate the responsibility.
A more extensive study -- one, for example, that included construction occupations
where the union does assume part of this task -- might have destroyed the strict
dichotomy between worker programming and employer programming which emerges here.
When, as in the restaurant industry, however, other institutions do not
assume this task, the training process places an enormous burden upon the individual,
Advancement is not a function of the particular jobs which people hold; the
potential chef holds many of the same jobs as the perpetual kitchen helper. But
the would-be chef, unlike the kitchen helper, is alert to learn; he is, moreover,
continually evaluating the learning potential of his present position and, when
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that potential has been exhausted, he is prepared to move to another establishment.
For this, and in the search for and selection of formal courses to supplement
training on the job, considerable motivation, initiative and enterprise are
required. The supply of trained labor will thus depend heavily upon the number
of workers possessing such traits, and workers who lack such traits will be
penalized more heavily in terms of advancement than in other sectors of the
economy.
A second contrast between the training of cook-chefs and that of skilled
workers in occupations whose employment is concentrated is in the distribution
of the cost of formal instruction. Would-be cooks must bear the cost of formal
instruction directly. In occupations where the instruction is provided by the
employer, the trainee bears the cost either not at all or only indirectly in the
form of earnings below those available to him in alternative employments. This
shift in the cost burden probably tends to exclude from cooks' training workers
who lack command over financial reserves and are unable to divert income from
consumption. The bias against such workers is probably most pronounced relative
to jobs in which training is employer-specific, i.e., of no value outside the
establishment which provides it. Because his training is useful only in his
current job, the specifically trained worker can obtain only an unskilled job
on the open market. To deter turnover, an employer would have to offer such a
worker a wage above the unskilled rate, but he could still pay a wage below the
worker's marginal product. And the difference between the wage and the marginal
product should serve as an incentive for the employer to invest his own resources
in the worker's training. When the training is not employer-specific and can
be utilized in a variety of competing establishments, it is widely believed that
the employer, because he expects competition to drive up the wage of trained
employees until all returns to training are absorbed, will shift the cost of
11
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training to the worker. The worker must thus forego current income to gain
access to training and this should act, like tuition charges, as a deterrent.
The direct tuition charges probably create a bias against those without
financial resources, however, even relative to jobs where the cost of training
is ultimately shifted to the labor force. This is so for at least two reasons.
First, some workers find it easier to forego present consumption if income is
deducted at its source than if the family must forego spending the income once
it has it in its hands: for these workers, training costs which are feasible
when they are borne indirectly through foregone earnings are intolerable when,
as in the restaurant industry, they must be paid out of pocket. Second, a
critical variable in the decision to invest in training is the rate of interest.
This determines the cost of financing training through borrowed funds. It also
indicated the retuims to alternative investments. The higher the rate of interest
faced by the individual, therefore, the less likely he is to engage in training.
Business firms generally have access to funds at interest rates significantly
below those available to the labor force. Thus, even if they pass on the cost
of training to the worker, their financial intermediation reduces the cost of
training below its level when it is borne by workers directly. Because this
effect depends upon the interest rate faced by the individual, it is an inverse
function of the individual's income, savings, and real estate assets.
The importance of these factors in curtailing the supply of cook-chefs depends,
of course, upon the relative importance of formal instruction in the development
of cooks. This cannot be gauged with precision. The 1963 Labor Department Survey
of occupational training found that 137o of all cooks reported formal training among
ways in which they had learned their job, and 5% (nearly 3/5ths of whom were
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trained formally in the army) reported formal training the most helpful way.
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These figures are not large; they imply that even where formal instruction is
important, it is secondary to on-the-job training. On the other hand, the total
includes a large number of short-order cooks and cook's helpers. The experienced
cooks and chefs interviewed in the present study indicated that in the courses
of their careers they had attended a variety of cooking classes. Such classroom
work may be critical to advancement toward the higher levels of the profession.
Cooks' training might conceivably differ from employer-sponsored training
in a third respect: the nature of the on-the-job training process and the
distribution of its costs. Such differences, however, were less apparent. The
essential nature of the process remains the same: skills are absorbed in the
process of production by the observation and imitation of experienced craftsmen
and are perfected, again in the production process, by repetition. The costs of
such training include any reduction in the productivity of the chef and his
assistant (who is the trainee), wasted raw materials, equipment downtime and
damage, and substandard output. The costs are, in other words, reflected in
the costs of production. They must thus be borne, in the first instance by the
employer. If the trainee is to bear them, they must be shifted to him.
There is reason to expect a shift to occur. The high turnover among
restaurant employees, which is critical to the training process, also makes
it unlikely that the employer can capture the increment to productivity which
results from training. That increment cannot therefore serve to remunerate the
employer for the costs incurred during the training period, and he would be
unlikely to tolerate such costs unless the workers who impose them compensate by
accepting wages below the market level.
A shift in training cost is to be expected for a second reason as well. Not
all chefs are equally good instructors. Under some men, a good deal of training
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occurs; others provide very little instruction at all. Clearly, for those wishing
to progress in the industry, positions under the former are preferred, and
competition for them should force their wages below the market rate.
Such wage differentiation should serve the additional purpose of driving
non-learners, who cannot anticipate higher future earnings as a return to current
wage sacrifices, from good training positions. This is important because those
working in subordinate kitchen positions range widely and include many with
no permanent attachment to the restaurant industry and no interest in learning
the chef's trade. The preemption by such people of training positions carries
an opportunity cost, and wage differentiation which discourages such preemption
performs a social function. The function, it may be noted, bears no relation
to the costs which training imposes upon the employer. The argument implies that
it would be desirable to have good training positions pay below market rates
even if training were costless, and, in fact, there is no necessary reason to
expect wage differentiation produced by the competition for positions under teach-
ing chefs to correspond to the differentiation required to compensate the employer
for training costs. A wage differential at least sufficient to cover training
costs should be produced by the employer's reluctance otherwise to tolerate the
training. But the differential might exceed this lower limit. The cost savings
would then presumably be appropriated by the chef whose tutelage is so greatly
desired.
Several chefs trained abroad spoke of the European market as if it operated
(or at least had operated) more or less in this way. Certain restaurants
were known throughout the continent for their great chefs; cooks trained in these
kitchens commanded premium pay; and ambitious youth were willing to make sacrifices
to work in their kitchens. But there was little indication that the market for
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chefs operated in this way in the area of the present study. Restaurant workers
were able to distinguish between the quality of instruction in the kitchens
where they had worked, but they did not possess broad knowledge of training
opportunities in the area. The expected wage differentiation was not present:
learners and non-learners received roughly the same pay for equivalent work.
Several factors appear to explain the failure of wage differentiation to
occur. First, it is not clear that there is a net cost of training to be trans-
ferred from the employer to the trainee. Much of the training process is free:
opportunities for observation and practice are present in the job whether or not
the incumbent takes advantage of them and there is no added cost to his doing so.
Efforts of the chef to aid the learning process, which might be expected to add
to the cost of production, appear to depend largely on his personal style of
operation. One of the respondents, for example, described a chef who was so
secretive that he sent all of the kitchen help on fetch-and-carry errands before
he made a sauce. The good instructors, in contrast, operate naturally in an
open manner, talk about what they are doing as they work, readily delegate
responsibility and encourage those around them to accept delegation. These
characteristics would seem to have more to do with the personality traits of
the man than with a deliberate decision to train or not to train. Short of
discharging one chef and hiring another, therefore, there is probably relatively
little the employer can do to expand or contract the amount of instruction which
occurs. The employer can, of course, discharge the chef. It is not clear,
however, that the personal styles most conducive to training are inherently less
productive than styles which are not. And, in fact, given the relatively small
size of the kitchen, the dominant position of the chef within it, and the close
working relationship between the chef and the manager (who is sometimes the owner
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as well) , the amount of instruction provided subordinates is probably one of
the lesser of the cost variables which the chef's personality traits affect.
An analogous argvunent can be made with respect to the subordinates whom
the chef trains. In fact, the burden which the requirements for successful
advancement in the restaurant industry place upon the individual implies that
learners will have motivation and drive which, other things being equal, will
make them considerably more productive than non-learners. The difference in
productivity may be enough, even more than enough, to compensate for the added
cost of the learning in which they engage.
At best, however, this line of reasoning will explain why employer efforts
to escape the burden of training costs does not generate wage differentials.
It does not explain the failure of competition for positions under good teaching
chefs to produce differentiation. Here, two other factors may be operative.
First, it is possible that there are simply not a sufficient number of motivated
individuals seeking instruction to make competition operative. There may be, in
other words, more than enough learning positions for those who desire to learn.
A second explanation, not necessarily exclusive of the first, is a paucity
in the market of information required to evaluate the merits of alternative
positions. The inadequacy of such information was suggested by the tendency of
very enterprising individuals to speak of good learning positions as if their
discovery was largely a matter of luck. Such an explanation is rendered plaus-
ible by the complexity of the information which existing channels must carry and
the variety of possibly offsetting job characteristics for which wage differentials
compensate. The quality of instruction is not the only factor which distinguishes
one kitchen from another; there is also wide variation with respect to working
hours, opportunities for overtime, the heat, the excitement of the job and the
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pressure under which it is performed. Even instruction is not of a piece.
Individuals do not generally acquire all of their skills in one kitchen: a
given kitchen may be a good place to learn at one stage in a cook's development
but not at another. Instruction, moreover, is to some extent individual, in the
nature of a tutorial between the chef and his subordinate: it occurs in a
kitchen at meal hour under great pressure and intense heat; and the personality
of the chef and his student may thus come to be decisive as to whether or not
learning occurs. To the extent that this is the case, an efficient matching of
students and teachers requires the circulation of an amount of information that
any system would be hard pressed to provide.
In sum, then, the worker-programmed pattern which predominates in the
training of restaurant cook-chefs is distinguished by (1) the motivation, initia-
tive and enterprise required by the individual worker, (2) the direct cost burden
of formal institutional instruction which it places upon the trainee, and (3) the
importance of the diffusion of information and of wage differentiation in matching
good teaching chefs with subordinates who will profit from exposure to them.
A strong argument can be made that, at least in the labor market where the
present study was conducted, these characteristics lead to an underinvestment in
cooks' training relative to the employer -sponsored training in other occupations.
Indicative of underinvestment is the failure of the expected wage differentiation
to materialize. That failure implies either an absence of information flows
and chef-subordinate matching required for efficient operation of the market £r
an excess training capacity within the industry, i.e., more than enough teaching
chefs to meet the demand of workers seeking instruction. The former points
toward governmental intervention to facilitate information flows and improve the
matching process. The latter is not in itself sufficient to warrant governmental
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intervention. The excess supply of teachers over students could result from
real social costs which make cooks' training less desirable than training for
other occupations. However, the motivational attributes and the resources
required of would-be cooks but not of trainees in occupations where training is
employer-sponsored give reason to believe that some of the factors restraining
the supply of cook trainees are the incidental result of market organization
and would be overcome, at relatively little cost and with some net social bene-
fit, by governmental intervention.
Current concern for the economic progress of disadvantaged, and particularly
of black, workers strengthens the argument for federal intervintion. It is
precisely these individuals that are least likely to possess the motivational
traits required for progress in the restaurant industry. They are, however,
disproportionately represented among restaurant cooks. The restaurant Industry,
moreover, has a tolerance for the instability of disadvantaged workers lacking in
concentrated industries with well -developed internal labor markets. And the
apparent shortage of cooks combined with the high turnover and relative ease of
upward mobility that turnover implies should make it possible for individuals
to progress without appearing to threaten the position of those directly above
them on the socio-economic ladder.
The cook-chef training reviewed for this study appeared, in the light of
these considerations, well designed. The program consisted of two basic compon-
ents: a ten week period of full-time classroom instruction (during which the
trainee received a stipend, which most trainees supplemented by part-time work
before or after school), succeeded by forty weeks of training on the job.
During the second phase, the class also met in the evenings once a week for
additional classroom instruction.
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The bridge between the classroom and on-the-job components, and in fact the
pivot around which the whole program revolved, was the trainer-coach . The
coach served as instructor in the classroom phase; he then solicited the on-the-job
training slots and placed the individual trainees. The on-the-job instructor
was provided largely by the enterprise's own chef, and participating restaurants
were paid $12 a week per trainee to free the chef's time for this purpose. But
the coach regularly visited the trainee at the job to supplement the chef's
instruction and to counsel the trainee and, occasionally, his supervisor. When
a trainee had exhausted the opportunities for instruction in one job, or when
irreconcilable conflicts between the trainee and his supervisor arose, the
t trainee-coach found the trainee a new position. The trainer-coach thus played
the role of the employer in the employer-sponsored training pattern, substituting
for the motivation and enterprise which would otherwise be required of the
trainee. The coach also substistuted for the role which wage differentiation
ought ideally to perform, chanelling information about potential trainees and
instructors and insuring that the proper marriage between them occurs. The
classroom portion of the program operated to alleviate the third burden which
worker-programmed, relative to employer-programmed, training places upon the
trainees, that of the direct cost of training. The classroom instruction also
alleviated for the trainee the burden of finding such programs on his own in
proprietary schools and community colleges. The only component of the program
which does not appear to make sense in terms of the deficiencies of the industries'
endogenous training patterns is the wage supplement paid to the employers. As was
seen above, wage differentiation does not appear to be required to compensate for
the cost of on-the-job instruction nor does it occur. Most employers questioned
on the subject seemed to feel the supplement was irrelevant. One manager reported
that the supplement upset his accountants considerably. For a while, they insisted
that he place it in escrow.
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While the program appeared well designed to overcome the deficiencies of
endogenous training patterns, however, it does not necessarily follow that it
succeeded in doing so. The services which the program offers are not only of
value to workers who could not progress without them; they are also valued by
people who would achieve training and advancement in the industry on their own.
These people, moreover, precisely because they possess the motivation and enter-
prise required for success, will also be the most active in seeking out programs
of this kind and pressing for admission. They have easy access to the trainer-
coach who in the nature of his work circulates widely in the local labor market.
If the most highly motivated are not to capture the program, therefore, the
coach must be prepared continually to resist this pressure and seek out instead
the unaggressive disadvantaged workers who are not likely to apply on their own.
It was clear in the restaurant programs -- and in the tool and die program,
which followed a very similar format, as well -- that the coach had not fully
succeeded in screening out candidates capable of making it on their own. The
most conspicuous failure in this regard was a participant in the program who was,
in fact, the chef in a large cafeteria, who employed a second trainee as his
assistant, and who was avowedly interested in the program for the formal instruc-
tion it provided. Other less extreme cases could be cited.
Counter-examples of trainees who did not seem to have sufficient internal
resources to succeed on their own (for whom success without the aid of the
program is dubious) can be also cited, but, whether on balance these are sufficient
to outweigh the numbers on the other side and to provide justification for the
programs is a moot question. It is not, in fact, clear how such a determination
can be made. It was initially thought that a control group could be used for
this purpose. But the correct control is not apparent. Use of trainees in a
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non-sponsored program -- the control group planned in the original project
proposal -- is clearly not feasible; there is no such program. A random sample
of the present population of chefs is one alternative; but since, in the past,
the industry has drawn more heavily upon Europe for training than it appears
possible for it to do in the future, the current group of chefs will not
reveal the character of those who will autonomously enter the occupation in
the future. A random sample of restaurant workers from whom the supply of new
chefs must be drawn appears to provide a better control. But it was apparent
from interviewing the trainees that no obvious, easily measurable attributes
would' be appropriate to distinguish those who would have made it on their own.
The critical variable is enterprise and motivation. The trainees with the most
obvious enterprise and motivation possessed those external characteristics
loosely used as a proxy for lack of these traits, i.e., race and parental back-
ground. And, because neither of the investigators were psychologists, no finer
psychological measures were attempted. Instead, a second fix upon the programs
was attempted: an examination of the institutional environment in which they
operated and of the incentives present in that environment to orient the
programs in the socially desirable direction.
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II. Motivation of the Sponsoring Institutions
The preceding section suggests that the three training programs were under
great pressure to support the endogenous training patterns of the occupations
studied. It was clear that, to some extent, at least, the programs succumbed to
this pressure, and to the extent that they did so, they simply substituted for
training which would otherwise have been privately executed and financed.
Whether, nontheless, the programs made some net contribution to training is a
moot question: it was not possible to answer this question from the data
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gathered in the studies, and it is not clear exactly what kind of data would
permit definitive judgments on this issue.
An alternative approach to this question is to examine the process through
which the programs were funded and the motivation of the sponsoring institutions,
for factors which are likely to lead the programs to resist (or accede to)
pressures to conform to endogenous patterns and to compel them to extend the
amount of training which these patterns provide.
The offset printing program was dependent upon five institutions: the two
sponsoring institutions, a trade union local and a local trade association; a
local employer who rented facilities for the program and from whose supervisory
force the instructors were hired; and two government agencies, the Division of
Employment Security and Bureau of Apprenticeship Training whose approval was
required for funding. The catalyst in the program was the union; its president
was largely responsible for the organization of the program. He was avowedly
motivated by concern about the fate of letterpress operators displaced by the
introduction of offset printing, and this provided the rationale for the project.
As noted earlier, however, there were very few displaced letterpress operators:
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the market for them was exceedingly tight, and it was probably for this reason
that employers preferred to train new men for offset. A more plausable explan-
ation for the union's interest, therefore, appeared to be the hope that by
training its members and placing them in offset jobs, it could establish a
claim to jurisdiction over the whole of that process. Its claim to parts of
the process, particularly the plate making and stripping, was otherwise tenuous.
The union contacted the firm who provided the instructor and facilities
through the regional graphic arts institute. The firm was at the time converting
some of its letterpresses to offset, and it was this apparently that led the
Institiite to recommend it to the union. The firm's management frankly admitted
in interviews that it was attracted by the prospect of federal funding for
training which they would otherwise have had to finance themselves. Their one
condition for participation was that they be given freedom to choose those from
their company admitted to the program. The idea of seeking MDTA funding -- and,
in fact, the whole program format and content -- derived from an earlier federally
funded program run by another local of the international union in Oakland,
California. The two proposals are almost identical. The fact that they were so
similar greatly facilitated the task of obtaining approval from the required
government agencies. These agencies relied heavily upon the precedent of the
California programs in assessing the soundness of the curriculum and the budget.
The program derived from the early phase of MDTA when it was chiefly concerned
with automation and structural unemployment: the fact that a technological
change was involved was compelling. A last requirement for approval was cert-
ification by the Division of Employment Security of the existence of a shortage
of offset press operators.
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In the tool and die program, the institutions participation included the
trade association, which sponsored the program, the employers who hired the
trainees during the OJT phase, and, again, the Division of Employment Security
and the Bureau of Apprenticehsip Training, whose approval was required for funding.
The central figure in the development of the program was a classic Schumpeterian
entrepreneur (known in the trade as an operator) . He originated the trainer-
coach format, sold the idea to the regional tool and die association of which
he was the executive director, and in his capacity as executive director, hired
his own consulting firm to set up and run the initial program of twenty trainees.
The trade association, subcontracting through the consulting firm, subsequently
established tool and die training projects funded by MDTA in several cities in
the region. The tool and die program included in the present study was one of
these.
The entrepreneur who sparked the program was obviously attracted by the
federal funding. Some of the larger cooperating companies were also attracted
by the federal funds which subsutituted for funds of their own which would
otherwise have been devoted to training. Several smaller employers may have
been induced to cooperate by a sense of duty to the craft and the industry.
The trainer-coach displayed considerable eloquence on this subject some of
which was reflected in the comments of participating employers. Many of the
smaller enqjloyers were also moved, however, by the recruiting services which
the trainer-coach provided. The trade association was obstensibly motivated by
the mutual interest of its members in overcoming the shortage of craftsmen, but
it was also apparent that the program became a justification for the organization
whose raison-d'etre was otherwise questionable. Approval by the government
agencies was greatly facilitated by the fact that they were presented with a
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standard format which they had previously endorsed a niomber of times. Indeed,
there is a sense in which previous endorsements made it impossible to refuse
a request to extend the program. Such a refusal would have called into question
the judgment of colleagues and superiors responsible for funding earlier
programs, and the officials making such decisions were not in a position to
collect the evidence necessary to sustain such an action.
The cook-chef program was developed by the same entrepreneur who promoted
the tool and die program, and it is probably best understood as an attempt to
extend his range of operations by capitalizing upon the tool and die experience.
The restaurant association, which nominally sponsored the tool and die program,
was organized by the entrepreneur for this purpose. (It subsequently branched
into the training of waitresses) . The association hired the entrepreneur as its
executive director, and subcontracted the training to the entrepreneur's firm.
Like the tool and die program, the cooks' training program included in this
study was one of several regional offshoots of a project begun on a very small
scale in the entrepreneur's home town. The restaurant activities of the entre-
preneur made use of the contacts within the U. S. Department of Labor and of
the extensive knowledge about how to promote training programs within that
bureaucracy which had been developed in connection with the tool and die program.
They also benefited from experience gathered in the tool and die industry with
training in general and with the use of the trainer-coach format in a dispersed
employment industry in particular. For the government agencies involved, familiar-
ity with the training format and with the personnel of the sponsoring organization
facilitated the approval of the initial contract; approval of subsequent programs
was facilitated by the fact that the first had been approved. For the government,
and for the promoter, a cooks' program had the additional advantage of operating
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in an industry that employed large numbers of minority group members at a time
when federal officials were placing increasing emphasis upon this goal. The
restauranteurs were attracted to the program (and to the association) by the
recruiting services of the trainer-coach.
The preceding synopsis makes clear that the individuals and non-governmental
institutions participating in the training programs under study had no intrinsic
interest in resisting pressure to support the endogenous training patterns;
some were in fact themselves the source of such pressure. Under these circum-
stances, resistance, if there is to be resistance, must be generated by the
federal agencies through the process of funding and review.
The federal agencies in the present instance failed to generate such
pressure. Their attention was confined to the certification of a shortage
in the occupation for which training was provided and a review of the training
procedures and concomitant costs. Attempts were not made to insure that the
training would actually serve to supplement endogenous patterns, and not
substitute for them. A partial exception was the emphasis in reviewing proposals
upon recruitment of the disadvantaged. This emphasis appears to have had an
effect upon the orientation, at least, of the restaurant program. Unfortunately,
the criterion "disadvantaged" -- or, at least, the group of variables used to
define it -- was not very sensitive to the distinction between those where progress
in the industry required the assistance of a special program and those with the
motivation and drive required to progress on their own. The latter were not,
therefore, effectively screened out.
The generation of resistance to pressure to conform to existing training
patterns is not solely a question of intent. A set of criteria which will
effectively distinguish -- either for purposes of program design and administration
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or in assessing the results of a completed project — institutions and individuals
who would not have become engaged in training autonomously is not obvious. The
straight -forward approach is to ask participating individuals if the program
affects their basic training decision and exclude those who say no. The approach
clearly creates a tremendous incentive for people to lie. The fact that several
firms in the present study answered negatively is probably indicative less of
their intrinsic honesty than of the absence of pressure within the programs to
avoid the windfall that an affirmative answer implies.
Without the cooperation of the individuals involved, a considerably more
elaborate test is required to screen out those who would have trained on their
own; some kind of psychological and motivational test for the labor force in
occupations where training is worker-programmed; an elaborate typology for firms
in industries where employer-sponsored training prevails. It is possible that
psychologists have developed instruments capable of the required distinctions
between individuals. But economists are nowhere near the development of instru-
ments that will make the required distinctions between firms,
A partial substitute for the explicit objective tests of the social scientist
is the "smell" test of a person who has grown up in the industry. Those who
really know a given industry seem to be able to tell when people within it
are being moved to depart from established practice and procedure. Such judg-
ments are not neat and clear; the reasoning which underlies them cannot always
be verbalized, and even where the reasoning is explicit, the evidence required
to support it can seldom be mustered. An agency accountable to the public has a
limited capacity to base its decisions upon criteria of this kind. That capacity
which it does have might, nontheless, be sufficient to create the requisite
pressure upon the programs. A policy of this kind necessitates at least one
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expert on the agency staff for each industry involved in training: a good sense
of "smell" in more than one industry is a very rare attribute.
Elaborate tests involving large, specialized staffs, are, however, deterred
by the procedure through which the programs are funded. Projects of less than
$50,000 are approved through the local office of the BAT without regional or
national review. Each of the projects studied fell below this ceiling. The
printing program costs roughly $15,000, the tool and die project, about $20,000,
the cooks project, about $35,000. The cost of prefunding investigation, there-
fore, quickly escalates toward the cost of the project, and elaborate procedures
cannot be justified. The local office, quite rightly from its perspective,
relies upon a cursory review and places great weigiht upon the precedent of
similar contracts funded elsewhere, which serves as a cheap proxy for more
expensive measures of program soundness. Post-project evaluations are also
deterred. The local office tends to view projects as isolated instances which
do not survive to benefit from whatever evaluations might uncover. In fact,
however, many of the projects are not isolated instances but part of a national
network which, in the case of the offset press program, included at least one
other project and, in the tool and die and cooks cases, a very large number.
At least nineteen cooks' projects, for example, had been completed before the
project in this study was begun. All three programs studied were, moreover,
repeated several times at the same sites, and for the pressmen and tool and
die programs, each repetition involved a separate contract. Only for the cooks'
training were the series of projects eventually consolidated in a single large
regional contract which attracted national attention and justified an elaborate
investigation, and by the time it was condolidated, the number of projects funded
separately in this industry, and in tool and die may have been sufficient to
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deter really dispassionate review. Thus, even were it feasible to develop
criteria which effectively distinguished new training opportunities, it is not
clear that existing review procedures could make use of them.
Finally, there remains the question of whether, given criteria which distin-
guished individuals and institutions who would engage in training on their own
and an administrative procedure which applied the criteria effectively to pre-
clude their participation, the non-governmental institutions now participating in
the program would continue to do so. In the cooks and tool and die programs --
we would like to argue more broadly, in those occupations where training is
worker-programmed and the program utilizes a trainer-coach -- continued partici-
pation appears likely. For the entrepreneur who organized these programs the
attraction was partly the excitement of the game, partly the game's reward.
The new rules would leave both. In fact, the recruiting services of the trainer-
coach which attracted employer participation would also remain. Training as
a raison-d 'etre for the trade association would continue as well -- although the
trade association appears important chiefly as a vehicle for the entrepreneur
and one would think a clever entrepreneur could find substitutes for it.
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